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Abstract 
 
We examine how much children and responsibilities related with them contribute towards 
the divergence of men’s and women’s wages, and consequently, to the formation of the 
gender wage gap. To derive the relative contribution of gender specific wage inequalities 
caused by the parenthood to the overall gender wage gap, we provide a modification of 
standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method, and correct simultaneously for selection 
into work and parenthood. Contrary to our expectations, the findings show that most of the 
gender wage inequality is due to the positive wage gap between men who do and do not have 
children and not due to the wage penalty incurred by mothers.  
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A gyermekvállalás áll a női-férfi bérkülönbség mögött? 
Komparatív elemzés Lengyelország és Magyarország 
adatain 
Ewa Cukrowska - Anna Lovász 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Azt vizsgáljuk, hogy a gyermekvállalás és ehhez kapcsolódó kötelezettségek mennyiben 
vezetnek eltérő férfi és női bérekhez, és ezen keresztül a nőr-férfi bérkülönbséghez.  
A standard Oaxaca-Blinder dekompozíciós eljárás módosított változatát dolgozzuk ki annak 
érdekében, hogy pontosan lássuk, mennyit magyaráz a teljes női-férfi bérkülönbségből a 
szülői bérkülönbség (parent gap). A béregyenletek becslésekor mind a munkába, mind a 
szülői státuszba való szelekciót figyelembe vesszük. Az elvárásainkkal ellentétben az 
eredmények azt mutatják, hogy a nemek közötti egyenlőtlenség nagyrésze az apák 
szignifikáns pozitív bérprémiumának tudható be, amit a gyermektelen férfiakhoz képest 
kapnak, nem az anyák relative bérhátrányának a gyermektelen nőkkel szemben. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: nemek közötti bérkülönbség, gyermekvállalási bérkülönbség, anyasági 
bérhátrány, bérkülönbség dekompozíciója 
 
JEL kódok: J13, J22 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Existing literature has documented that having children may contribute towards lower wages 
for women and a slight wage premium for men compared to childless individuals. Although 
child and marriage controls were originally primarily used to control for unmeasured human 
capital misspecification and unmeasured productivity (Hill, 1979), the investigation of the 
effects of these two factors on the wage level has recently gained researcher’s greater 
attention. The growing research on these topics led to the appearance of such terms as a 
‘motherhood penalty’ or a ‘family gap’ and a ‘fatherhood premium’ (Waldfogel, 1997, 
Waldfogel, 1998, Budig and England, 2001, Anderson et al., 2002, Datta Gupta and Smith, 
2002, Lundberg and Rose, 2002). 
Despite the growing empirical research on the wage gap between parents and childless 
individuals, no clear link between the parenthood effects on wages and the gender wage gap 
has been established. However, there are strong reasons to expect that - given the positive 
effect of children on men’s wages and the negative effect on the wages of women - 
parenthood is likely to contribute significantly to the divergence of the wages of men and 
women and consequently to the evolution of the gender wage gap.  
In this paper, we combine the two fields of the research on the wage effects of parenthood 
and gender wage inequality, by proposing a gender wage gap decomposition that directly 
accounts for the existence of the wage differences between male and female parents and 
childless individuals. We carry out the analysis for Hungary and Poland, examining the 
magnitudes of the gaps in wages due to gender and parenthood, and the contribution of the 
family gaps to the gender wage differential. Poland and Hungary represent transition 
economies, for which the wage inequalities caused by the parenthood have not been studied 
so far as most of the research has concentrated on Western countries, especially the US, UK, 
Germany, as well as Denmark and the Netherlands.1,2  On the other hand, the two countries 
differ in the policies and benefits provided to families with children, which are likely to 
influence individual’s, and especially women’s, labor market activity (Fodor et al., 2002). 
                                                 
1 On the other hand, transition economies were throughout investigated with regards to the changing 
gender disaggregated wage structure following the collapse of communism (see for example: Brainerd, 
2000; Pailhé, 2002). 
2 A comprehensive cross-country analysis of the family gaps in Europe includes eleven European 
countries but all of them represent Western European economies (Davies and Pierre, 2005). 
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Their comparison can therefore reveal some of the effects of differences in the provision of 
these policies.3   
Our empirical strategy aimed at deriving the contribution of the family gaps among men 
and women to the overall gender wage gap is based on several stages. First, we estimate wage 
equations for men and women as well as parents and nonparents. We recognize that in most 
of the existing literature, estimates of the parenthood effect may be biased due to the multiple 
selection processes that are present: 1) selection into being employed and 2) the choice of the 
parenthood status. We address these methodological problems using Dubin’s and 
McFadden’s selection correction model (Dubin and McFadden, 1984). In the second step, we 
use the estimated wage equations and concentrate on the gender wage gap decomposition. In 
order to directly assess the relative contribution of the family gaps among men and women to 
the overall gender wage gap, we propose a modification of Oaxaca-Blinder mean 
decomposition (1973).  
Our findings suggest that the existence of the gender wage gap is largely due to the 
positive wage gap between men who do and do not have children, explaining about half of the 
gender gap. In Hungary, the family gap among women is entirely explained by women’s 
selection into employment and motherhood, and it is not found to constitute a significantly. 
In Poland, accounting for selection at both levels results in a higher estimated cost of 
motherhood, so wage inequality between mothers and non-mothers contributes to the gender 
wage differential to a higher extent. Marriage has a significant negative effect on women’s, 
and positive effect on men’s wages, suggesting that, contrary to what is seen in most western 
European countries, specialization into gender roles – and the wage disadvantage of women 
– takes place when marriage takes place rather than later, after having children. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we summarize 
theories on the link between family gaps and the gender wage gap, along with the existing 
literature that is relevant to the discussion, showing the gap our research aims to fill. Section 
three describes the datasets used in the empirical research. In section four we present the 
empirical methodology used in the analysis in two parts. The first part discusses the 
problems involved in the estimation of the wage equations as well as the selection correction 
we use to alleviate them; the second part proposes a gender wage gap decomposition that 
accounts for the family gaps in wages. In section five, we present the main results along with 
their interpretation, discussing the impact of the selection correction methodology as well. In 
                                                 
3 Hungary provides universal benefits for women, whereas Poland follows very strict means-tested 
eligibility criteria. The length of maternity leave differs: while in Poland, it was around 14-18 weeks in 
2004-2009, in Hungary it was 24 weeks. In Poland, the share of children in state subsidized childcare 
is among the lowest across the European countries, that of Hungary is somewhat higher. 
Consequently, Hungary should provide better opportunities for women to combine their work and 
family obligations. 
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section six discusses the new evidence gained from the applied empirical methodology and 
country comparison, highlighting interesting future research directions..   
 
2. THE FAMILY AND GENDER WAGE GAPS – HOW DO CHILDREN AND 
FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES CONTRIBUTE TO GENDER WAGE GAP 
FORMATION? 
Several theories exist that aim to explain the existence of a wage premium caused by the 
parenthood. In the case of women, existing research distinguishes at least five possible 
sources of mother’s lower wages compared with childless women: 1) loss of human capital 
and its depreciation during maternity leave and time out of the labor market due to 
childrearing (Buligescu et al., 2009, Waldfogel, 1998); 2) compensating wage differential 
theory – choosing “mother friendly” jobs and sectors; 3) unobserved heterogeneity of 
mothers and childless women; 4) Becker’s work effort theory stating that lower wages of 
mother result from their lower productivity caused by the presence of children; 5) 
discrimination based theories. Recently, more in-depth explanations have been tested, such 
as the differences in the labor market behavior measured by the intensity of the job search of 
mothers and childless women (Zhang, 2012) and changes in the non-wage aspects of the job 
around the motherhood (Felfe, 2012). Higher wages of fathers compared with non-fathers 
are in turn mainly explained by the theory of specialization. According to this theory, 
following childbirth, women tend to specialize in home production, whereas men in 
production in the labor market (Lundberg and Rose, 2002, Killewald and Gough, 2013). 
Higher wages of fathers are also associated with unobserved gains in their productivity 
induced by fatherhood, or their positive discrimination by the employers caused by a higher 
valuation of fathers’ social status (Glauber, 2008).  
At the same time, there are a large number of studies on the gender wage gap in general, 
and some surveys on the topic (international reviews include Weichselbaumer and Winter-
Ebmer (2005), and Hersch (2006)). However, previous estimates do not aim to measure the 
contribution of the family gap to the overall gender gap, despite the fact that biological and 
cultural differences between the genders related to childbearing are clearly an important 
factor (Hersch, 2006). However, to the best of our knowledge, there are only few studies that 
to link the wage effects of marital status, children, and thus, family commitments and the 
gender wage gap. Dolton and Makepeace (1986) argued that wage equations, as well as the 
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selection equations that pre-determine wages, may differ based on the family status.4 Their 
findings indicate that single and married women have different selection specifications, and 
childless and child rearing women have different selection as well as earning equations. 
Based on the estimated earning equations, Dolton and Makepeace (1986) further decompose 
the gender wage gap according to Oaxaca-Blinder methodology. They estimate the 
unexplained components of the wage gaps between different subgroups of married/single 
and child rearing/childless men and women. Waldfogel (1998) also argues that there exists a 
relation between the family gap and gender wage gap. She writes: ‘The family gap may be 
another reason why the gender gap is larger in the United States than in other countries’. 
According to Waldfogel (1998) the prevalence of a gender wage gap in the U.S. may be caused 
by the relatively low provision of family policies such as maternity leave and child care 
(especially until 1993, when the U.S. did not have a national maternity leave policy). Based on 
the OLS wage equations, she decomposes the gender wage gap in 1980 and 1991 to find out 
that while the gender wage gap has declined, the relative contribution of the marital and 
parental characteristics and returns has increased.  
Although some attempts have been undertaken to combine the findings on the family and 
gender wage gaps, they are rather weak, and suffer from methodological problems. Dolton 
and Makepeace (1986) do not provide estimates of the contribution of the family gap to the 
gender wage gap and investigate several gaps between male/female and marital and 
parenthood combinations. Waldfogel (1998) in turn uses standard OLS estimation, which 
estimates – especially for women – are likely to be biased due to the employment selection 
and endogeneity of parent variables in the earning equation. In consequence, based on the 
existing literature, no strong evidence may be found on the role of parenthood in the 
formation of the gender wage gap and the extent children contribute to general gender wage 
gap inequality. Our research fills this gap by providing direct evidence on this relationship, 
based on empirical methods that correct for some major potential biases present in the 
estimation. 
 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
For the empirical analysis, we use the data from the Household Budget Surveys (HBS) for 
Poland and Hungary. The databases contain the information on the demographic 
characteristics as well as the labor market activity and housing and living conditions. The 
                                                 
4 They test  their hypothesis by investigating the significance of the dummy variables indicating 
parenthood and relationship status as well as the interaction terms both in earning and selection 
equations. 
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design of the databases allows us to derive the information on the family situation and 
parenthood status. The datasets have, however, certain drawbacks regarding reported 
earnings that are further discussed below. Despite these, these datasets contain information 
that is crucial for the identification of our empirical model.5 Given the structure of other 
national datasets that could be used (for example Labor Force Survey) the HBSs seem to 
better meet the requirements regarding the collected information.6   
For Poland, we use recent data for 1999-2009 that are collected based on the same 
statistical methodology, which is a monthly rotation of the household. Each year 
approximately 37,000 households take part in the survey but the total number of individuals 
varies across the years. The data on the labor market activity is collected only for individuals, 
who at the time of the interview were at least 15 years old. Due to the limited data on some 
other variables, we additionally restrict the sample to most recent years 2005-2009. In 
Hungary, the household data is available for the years 2006-2009. Household income, 
spending, and characteristics are collected in March-April of each year. Labor market data is 
collected for individuals aged 16 or above, and this data refers to the current status (overall 
activity variable), or to the previous year (monthly activity variables).7 The data is also 
collected based on a rotational panel. About 1800 households are included in the survey.  
We consider only employed individuals who are not in self-employment, not working in 
agriculture and are of working age (16-64 for men and 16-59 for women). We further restrict 
the sample to individuals, who are 25 to 60 years old. We do so because individuals aged 16-
25 are very likely to be still studying, which makes the mechanism of selection into 
employment less clear.  
The dependent variable in our analysis is the natural logarithm of hourly wage. For the 
Polish HBS, the data on earnings are collected based on monthly information, meaning that 
only the average nominal monthly earnings are provided. Usually, the hourly wage could be 
derived using the information on the exact hours worked. However, for Polish HBS there is 
no information on the hours worked and only an indicator of part time employment is 
available. Given the data structure, we decide to concentrate only on full time employees, 
whose average hours worked are likely to be less diverged than part-time workers.8 We 
                                                 
5 That is: the datasets contain unique variables that are essential for the identification of the model 
correcting for selection bias. These variables are listed in section 4.1., in which the exclusion 
restrictions are discussed.  
6 For Poland the LFS does contain more precise wage information. It does not however provide the 
information on housing condition that we use for the identification. For Hungary, the LFS data does 
not contain earnings. 
7 For our sample dataset, we use the past year’s status, since this is the time period for which the wage 
information is available. 
8 This is not such a significant restriction in the case of these two countries, as the share of part-time 
workers is low. In Hungary, about 4.7% of workers report working part-time, while in Poland, this is 
9%. 
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recalculate the hourly wage assuming that the average number of hours worked per week is 
40. On the other hand, for the Hungarian dataset the information on the wages is collected 
based on a yearly basis, and contains information on hours worked, thus it is possible to 
calculate hourly wages more accurately than in the case of Poland. However, due to our 
restriction of the sample to full time workers, this correction for actual hours worked does 
not make a significant difference, as most  report as working the standard 40 hours per week.  
The principal variable in our analysis is a variable that indicates the presence of a child. 
The datasets does not contain precise information whether an individual has a child. We thus 
derive a variable indicating whether an individual is a child, and then calculate total number 
of children a mother or father has based on the indicators of household and parental 
relations. We define a child as an individual that is living in the household with his parents 
and is below 25 years old.  
The final sample for Poland consists of 105,183 individuals, out of which 61,326 are men, 
and 43,857 are women. Around 65 percent of individuals that are included in the sample 
have children. Women are found to be better educated than men, as the share of women with 
tertiary education is around 30 percent, whereas of men around 17 percent. Average hourly 
wage of women is around 8 PLN and of men around 10 PLN.9 For Hungary, the final sample 
is smaller and consists of 10,821 out of which 6,045 are men and 4,776 are women. Similarly 
to Poland, around 60 percent of individuals have children. The hourly wage for men is 
around 890 HUF, and for women 766 HUF. Detailed summary statistics are presented in 
Table A. 1 and Table A. 2 in the Appendix. 
 
4. ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK – METHODOLOGY 
4.1. MODELING THE WAGE EQUATIONS 
The estimation of the gap in wages caused by parenthood is a methodologically complex 
problem as the decision whether to have a child may be related to unobservable factors that 
influence wages as well. These may include commitment and devotion to work and individual 
career orientation.  Moreover, only selected individuals are observed working, which means 
that additionally there is a problem of labor market (employment) selection. Most often in 
the previous literature on family gaps, the above mentioned selection concerns are 
investigated separately, with the consequence that the estimates corrected for employment 
selection are still likely to be biased if parenthood selection takes place, and the estimates 
                                                 
9 Wages are expressed in constant prices from 2005. The wages for Poland are reported in Polish 
zlotys (PLN), whereas for Hungary in Hungarian forints (HUF).  
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that account for the heterogeneity of parents and non-parents are still biased due to 
employment selection. Since both selection processes are likely to be present simultaneously, 
truly unbiased estimators can be obtained only if both of them are accounted for. This can be 
achieved by applying a double selection model (Tunali 1986; Lee 1979; Ham 1982; Fisher et 
al. 1981) or multinomial correction models (Lee, 1983; Dubin and McFadden, 1984; Dahl, 
2002).10  
To report unbiased estimates of the wage equations for female and male parents and non-
parents we apply the multinomial correction model proposed by Dubin and McFadden 
(1984). As shown by Bourguignon et al. (2007), Dubin’s and McFadden’s model performs 
well, and it is preferred to other selection models that involve several alternatives, such as 
Lee’s (1983) or Dahl’s models (2002). We outline Dubin’s and McFadden’s model, hereafter 
DMF, adapted to our conceptual framework.   
Individuals choose their particular employment-parenthood status out of four possible 
alternatives: being (1) a working parent, (2) a working non-parent, (3) a not working parent 
and (4) anon-working non-parent. The choice of the employment-parenthood status for men 
and women is modeled by the multinomial logit model of a form: 11 
 ,             (1) 
where j= {f, m} refers to females (f) and males (m) and s= {1,2,3,4} denotes the four possible 
alternatives. The wage equation for each possible combination of the employment-
parenthood decision is given by: 
 .          (2) 
The bias of the estimates occurs because the error terms and  may be correlated 
as there may exist some unobservable characteristics that affect both the choice of 
employment–parenthood status and the wage rate. Assuming that the error terms are 
linearly related so that , where  
denotes correlation coefficient between  and  as in equations (1) and (2), and the 
selection equation is modeled with the use of multinomial logit, it can be shown that: 
 ;                                                (3) 
                                                 
10 For a review of selection correction methods based on the multinomial logit model, see Bourguignon 
et al. (2007).  
11 The first step of the model, that is the multinomial logit, requires that rather restrictive assumption 
of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is met. This restriction means that the evaluation 
of an alternative to another alternative does not change if other (irrelevant) alternative is added to the 
set of choice. Bourguignon et al. (2007) however show that DMF correction method performs well 
even if the IIA hypothesis is violated. Still, in order to test whether the IIA hypothesis holds we 
additionally perform diagnostic tests due to Hausman and Small Hsiao. The tests provide mixed 
results. The results are available from the authors upon the request. 
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 ;     (4) 
where  is a probability that the alternative s is preferred. Given the linearity assumption 
and model’s initial restriction of , this implies that the outcome equation 
conditional on choosing s=1 is given by: 
    (5) 
In the wage equations, we include several control variables. First, in accordance with 
Becker’s human capital theory (Becker, 1964) we apply a Mincerian form wage equation and 
control for the level of education and age of individuals.12 The decision to marry may also 
impact the labor market outcomes of men and women, which we account for via the inclusion 
of a dummy variable for a marital status with single individuals left as the reference group.13 
The parenthood effect we measure is therefore separated from the marriage effect. In line 
with existing literature that reports higher wages for individuals working in the private sector 
(Heitmueller, 2006), we also control for the sector of work.14 We do not account for the 
occupations, as the choice of occupation may be endogenous in the wage equation and 
correlated with the decision on the parenthood. It is also not clear whether occupational 
outcomes are already a result of discriminatory practices of the employers or pure gender–
specific occupational choices.15 Finally, we control for regional disparities by accounting for 
the size of the place of living in terms of the total number of inhabitants, region of the 
country, and whether an individual is living in the capital, since these factors are likely to 
differentiate average wages. Overall, our aim is to account for potential selection biases, while 
measuring the overall effect of parenthood on wages occurring through all potential channels. 
The identification of the model requires valid exclusion restrictions that are included in 
the estimation of the choice of employment-parenthood status and excluded from the wage 
regression. We use a set of exclusion restrictions that have been previously adapted in a 
similar research and are also available in our datasets (Joshi et al., 1999). These variables 
                                                 
12 The datasets we use do not provide a measure of labor market experience. We include both age and 
education, but  not the potential experience that could be calculated. As shown by Anderson et al. 
(2003) potential experience overestimates women’s actual experience if women who have children 
take time off to raise the children. This means that our estimates of the effect of parenthood include 
the effect it has through influencing the amount of time spent in the labor market, which is a 
potentially important channel as outline in the literature review. 
13 We restrict the sample to individuals who are either married or single. We do not consider divorced 
or widowed individuals as for these individuals the parenthood status may be incorrectly specified. 
Parenthood is defined as having a child that is still living in the household and is at most 25 years old. 
For divorced individuals we are therefore unable to identify correctly whether he or she has a child as 
the child is living only with one of the parents.   
14 This is true only for Poland, for Hungary there is no information on the sector of work in the 
database.  
15 As it is questionable whether to account for the occupational choices, we do, however, also run the 
analysis controlling for occupations. The results are comparable to the findings obtained when the 
occupational controls are excluded. 
13 
 
include: an indicator whether an individual has a spouse that is employed, the age of the 
spouse, the total non-labor income available to the household, the total number of 
individuals living in the household and housing conditions, which are the total number of 
rooms and housing tenure.  
We report both the estimates from the DMF model and OLS regressions to assess the 
bias. As the DMF estimation is based on two stage approach and standard errors from the 
second stage are not efficient, in the DMF estimations we provide bootstrapped standard 
errors. Given that the estimation of the family gap is usually carried out via the inclusion of a 
dummy variable indicating the presence of children in the wage equation (for example: 
Waldfogel, 1997, Walfogel, 1998), we additionally complement our analysis with this 
approach and compare the estimates for Poland and Hungary with previously obtained ones 
for other economies.  
 
4.2. DECOMPOSING THE GENDER WAGE GAP THAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE 
PARENTHOOD 
The primary goal of this paper is to assess to what extent the existence of the family wage gap 
may contribute to the gender wage gap. To do so - based on the wage equations estimated 
using both the selection correction model and OLS - we propose an extension of standard 
gender wage gap decomposition commonly referred to Oaxaca-Blinder mean decomposition 
(1973).  
In the present setting, we have four different wage equations: for childless women, for 
mothers, for childless men, and for fathers. Denoting the separate wage equation for parents 
and non-parents as: 
          (9) 
Where c = {CH, NCH} refers to two observed states of employment and parenthood status 
(CH - being working parent and NCH - being working non-parent) and j = {f, m} for female 
and male, we can write the mean wage levels for men and women as: 
       (10) 
       
 (11) 
where  and  are the shares of women and men who have children. After very simple 
algebraic manipulation these can be rewritten as: 
       (12) 
       (13) 
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where the terms in parentheses are the family gaps in wages by gender. Incorporating the 
above equations to the standard mean gender wage gap decomposition, defined as a mean 
difference in log wages of men and women, we have: 
       (14) 
The gender wage gap can be thus separated into three components that represent the 
family gap among men and women, and the gap in wages among non-parents. Note that 
because of the negative sign in front of the measure of the family gap among women, when 
the gap exists - that is when women with children earn lower wages - then it contributes 
positively towards the formation of the overall gender wage gap. Each of the three 
components may be additionally decomposed into explained (endowment) and unexplained 
(remuneration) components using the Oaxaca and Blinder decomposition method.  
In the case of the wage equations corrected for the selection, on the right hand side of the 
estimated equations we will additionally have expressions that represent the correction 
terms. Usually the selection terms are treated in two manners. The first approach treats the 
selection terms as a separate component of the decomposition and portions the gap into 
explained, unexplained and selection parts. The second set of the studies subtracts the 
selection correction terms from both sides of the estimated equation and reports the gap in 
‘potential’ (or offered) wages (Neuman and Oaxaca, 2004). We interpret the selection terms 
as an additional selection component representing the part of the gap that is due to the 
difference in the selection patterns.   
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 WAGE EQUATIONS 
Detailed results from the OLS and DMF estimations of the wage equations are presented in 
Appendix in Table A. 3 for Poland and Table A. 4 for Hungary. The OLS results for Poland 
show that full time female workers rather than a motherhood penalty receive a positive 
premium of 1.5 percent from their motherhood. For Hungary the respective estimate is 
around negative 1.9 percent but the result is not statistically significant. In line with the 
expectation, positive premium is present for fathers: in Poland full time male workers receive 
by 7.8 percent higher wages than men who do not have children, whereas in Hungary the 
respective premium is lower and equals to positive 1 percent. For Hungary the result is again 
not statistically significant.  
The estimated coefficients related to the variable indicating the individual marital status 
show that both in Poland and Hungary marriage has a positive impact on the wages of men. 
15 
 
In Hungary, the effect is around 14 percent and in Poland around 17 percent. The effect of 
marriage for women in the case of Hungary is negative and equals to 4.6 percent and in the 
case of Poland to positive 1 percent.  
The results are interesting when compared with the OLS estimates found for Western 
economies, especially the US (Budig and England, 2001; Korenman and Nuemark, 1992, 
Lundberg and Rose, 2002). The estimates of the motherhood penalty for Poland and 
Hungary are much smaller, whereas the estimates of the effect of marriage are much higher, 
than the ones found for other economies. On the other hand, the effects of marriage present 
for men are much higher than the ones reported by Lundberg and Rose (2002) for the US. 
The results thus show that for Poland and Hungary it is mostly the marital not the parental 
status that is influencing the earnings of men and women. This means that the specialization 
of men and women in the labor and household production is likely to be observed following 
the marriage itself and not the presence of children.  
The estimation output for the subsamples of individuals who do and do not have children 
shows that the returns of the observable characteristics, such as age and education, are 
different for parents and nonparents. The wage-age profiles are much steeper for nonparent 
– both men and women – than parents, which may reflect parents lower human capital 
accumulation due to the career interruptions caused by the parenthood. The returns from 
education are slightly higher for nonparents.  
The estimates corrected for the selection bias are presented in columns 7-10 in Table A. 3 
(for Poland) and Table A. 4 (for Hungary). Both for Poland and Hungary, the correction 
terms are found to be significant showing that the selection is critical for a proper analysis of 
the family gaps among men and women. For both countries, in all the wage equations the F-
tests of the joint significance of correction terms results in the rejection of a null hypothesis 
stating that the corrections have no effect on wages. 16 
The estimates of mother’s wage equation for Poland and Hungary show that there is a 
negative correlation between the unobservable factors influencing the wages of mothers and 
the unobservable determinants of the choice of being working and not having children. Such 
factors may include for example an ability to handle multi tasks and workload. This may be 
interpreted as a positive selection of women into the motherhood. The effect is highly 
statistically significant for Poland but weakly significant for Hungary. On the other hand, the 
positive coefficient related to the choice of being a not working mother shows that the 
unobservable factors related to the choice of this state are positively correlated with 
                                                 
16 In the case of Hungary the F-test of a joint significance of selection terms results in the value of 7.7 
(p=0.0) for mothers, 2.39 (p=0.067) for non-mothers, 3.94 (p=0.008) for fathers and 6.28 (p=0.0) for 
non-fathers. In the case of Poland the respective values are 15.56 (p=0.0), 3.34 (p=0.0), 176.95 
(p=0.0), 80.22 (p=0.0). 
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unobservable factors influencing wages of mothers. This finding shows that among mothers 
there is a negative selection into the employment. For Poland we additionally observe a 
negative selection into employment among working non-mothers (column 7 Table A. 3); this 
effect is not found for Hungary.  
The estimates of wage equations for men for Poland and Hungary show mixed results. In 
Poland, it is the employment selection that is mostly important. In the case of working 
fathers in Poland we observe a positive correlation between unobservable factors that 
influence father’s wages and unobservable determinants of being a not working father. There 
is also a negative relation between unobservable factors that are influencing the choice of 
being a not working non-father and unobservable determinants of father’s wage. The findings 
thus show that working fathers in Poland are negatively selected into employment out of all 
fathers and positively selected into the family-employment status if compared to not working 
childless men. In the case of wage equation of childless working men the selection 
coefficients show that unobservable factors influencing their wages are negatively related to 
unobservable factors related to the choice of being a working parent. Such unobservable 
factors may include for example devotion and attachment to the workplace and employment. 
The same effect is found for Hungary but it is not statistically significant.17  
 
5.2 DECOMPOSITION OF THE GENDER WAGE GAP THAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE 
FAMILY GAPS IN WAGES 
The results of the gender wage gap decomposition that shows the relative contribution of the 
family gaps are presented in Table 1. Detailed results that involve the family gaps 
decompositions are presented in the Appendix. We report both the decomposition based on 
OLS and DMF, and compare the role of selection processes. 
For Poland, the gender wage gap that shows the difference in the wages of men and 
women expressed as a percentage of the average men’s wage, accounts for 18.6 percent.18 In 
Hungary, the respective gap is lower, and accounts for around 10.4 percent.19  Both in Poland 
and Hungary, the decomposition that uses OLS wage estimation results shows that roughly 
half of the gender wage gap is due to fathers’ relatively higher wages (family gap among men). 
                                                 
17 The estimates of the returns from the human capital in the wage equations corrected for the 
selections are in general higher than the ones obtained from the uncorrected estimations. Both the 
returns from the education and age are thus overestimated if the selections are not accounted for. 
18 Detailed decomposition results shows that the gap is found to be not explained by the differences in 
the distribution of the characteristics. This means that if men in Poland followed the distribution of 
women’s education, than their wage would be actually higher and the average gender wage gap would 
increase.   
19 Similarly to the gender wage gap in Poland, the explained portion of the gender wage gap is negative 
(mostly due to educational differences, since female employees are relatively highly qualified). 
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For Poland, the family gap among men is around 13percent and it constitutes 45percent of 
the total gender wage gap. The respective family gap among women is around 3 percent. This 
fact contributes to the overall gender wage gap in only 9 percent.  
The rest of the gender wage gap (46 percent) is due to the gender wage inequality among 
childless individuals. In Hungary, the family gap among men is smaller than in Poland and it 
is equal to 9percent. The gap makes up 51percent of the total gender gap. On contrary, the 
family gap in wages of women in Hungary is higher than in Poland, and is equal to negative 8 
percent. This fact accounts for the remaining 50 percent of the total gender wage gap. The 
results thus show that while in Poland, parenthood-based wage inequalities contribute to the 
gender wage gap mostly because of men’s wage premium from being a father, in Hungary the 
gender wage gap may be attributed to unequal wage distribution of fathers and non-fathers 
as well as mothers and non-mothers. Detailed decomposition results (Table A. 5 and Table A. 
6 in the Appendix) show that these parenthood-based inequalities in Hungary are mostly 
explained by the distribution of observable characteristics. In Poland, men’s higher wages are 
only partly explained by father’s higher human capital endowments.  
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Table 1.  
Contribution of the family gaps among men and women to total gender wage 
differential for Poland and Hungary 
 
Poland Hungary 
Gender wage 
gap (GWG) 
0.187 0.104 
 
OLS DMF OLS DMF 
  Estimates 
% of 
GWG Estimates 
% of 
GWG Estimates 
% of 
GWG Estimates 
% of 
GWG 
Family gap 
women -0.027 9% -0.027 9% -0.081 49% -0.081 49% 
Explained -0.040 14% -0.025 9% -0.082 50% -0.064 38% 
Unexplained 0.014 -5% -0.029 10% 0.000 0% 0.054 -33% 
Selection NO NO 0.027 -9% NO NO -0.072 44% 
Family gap 
men 0.127 45% 0.127 45% 0.090 51% 0.090 51% 
Explained 0.047 16% 0.031 11% 0.080 46% 0.058 33% 
Unexplained 0.080 28% 0.141 50% 0.010 6% 0.015 9% 
Selection NO NO -0.046 -16% NO NO 0.016 9% 
GWG 
childless 
individuals 0.087 46% 0.087 46% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 
Explained -0.106 -50% -0.084 -45% -0.123 -117% -0.114 -109% 
Unexplained 0.192 97% 0.125 67% 0.121 116% 0.193 185% 
Selection NO NO 0.046 25% NO NO -0.080 -77% 
Note: Detailed estimation results are included in the Appendix. 
Once we account for the selections of individuals into the employment and parenthood 
status, the findings related to parenthood-based sources of gender wage inequality change 
significantly. For Hungary, we observe that the gap in wages that is due to parenthood is 
overestimated because of the differences in the selection patterns between mothers and non-
mothers. The decomposition results show that women’s selection nearly entirely explains the 
existence of the female family gap in wages. For men, we observe that the differences in the 
selection processes among fathers and non-fathers account for less than one fifth of the 
family gap among men (18 percent, see Table A. 8) and only 9 percent of total gender wage 
gap. This means that if the selections are accounted for, we find slightly lower family gap 
among men. On the other hand, the raw gap among childless men and women in Hungary is 
small and insignificant (-1 percent) but the differences in selection process lead to its high 
increase.  
For Poland, we observe different patterns when the selections are controlled for. For 
women, differences in the selection processes cause the true family gap to be higher than the 
observed one. The differences in the selection processes among mothers and childless 
women, and especially mother’s positive selection into working and having kids, thus 
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contribute towards the widening of the gap in their average wages. Consequently, the gap in 
mother’s and non-mother’s wages constitutes a significant part of the gender wage 
differential. For men we observe similar results. The difference in the selection processes 
among fathers and non-fathers does not explain the gap in their wages, but contributes 
towards its increase. The same argument thus follows, that the gap in father’s and non-father’ 
wages contributes towards the persistence of the gender wage gap to a higher extent. In 
consequence of the selections, the true gender wage gap among childless individuals in 
Poland is likely to be smaller than the observed one. 
To conclude, the decomposition results show that accounting for the selections is critical 
for the analysis of gender and family based inequalities. Wage inequalities due to parenthood 
explain the gender wage gaps in Poland and Hungary in a different manner. In Hungary, 
women’s selection into employment and parenthood entirely explains the gap in their wages, 
and the gender wage gap is mostly due to the high difference in the wages of males and 
females who do not have children and the family gap among men. In Poland, however, the 
female’s family gap is underestimated and accounting for the selection leads to its increase. 
In consequence, higher part of the gender wage gap is attributable to mother’s lower earnings 
compared to women who do not raise kids. Men’s selection also causes the family gap among 
men to increase, so that it also constitutes a significant source of gender wage inequality.  
This means that while in Hungary, parenthood-based inequalities explain the gender 
wage gap mostly via father’s wage premium, in Poland, the gender wage gap is largely due to 
the prevalence of both mother’s labor market disadvantage, and father’s positive wage 
premium. When looking at the detailed decomposition results of the family gaps among men 
and women (Table A. 7 and Table A. 8) it is clear that the existence of the family gap among 
men is largely unexplained by the differences in the distribution of their characteristics 
suggesting that unobservable factors, that may include father’s longer working hours, which 
we do not fully control for, as well as employer’s positive discrimination,  may explain their 
wage premiums.  
  
6.  CONCLUSION 
This paper analyzes family gaps among men and women and their relative contribution to the 
overall gender wage inequality. The analysis is carried out for two transition countries: 
Poland and Hungary that differ in the prevailing family models and policies available to 
women and families with children.  
In the paper we present and discuss two main methodological problems that cause OLS 
estimation of the wage inequality by parenthood and gender to provide bias results. We 
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address these problems simultaneously by adopting the multiple selection model due to 
Dubin and McFadden (1984). The results of this paper show that indeed the selection 
processes are critical for an identification of the relation between parenthood and men’s and 
women’s wages. While the selection into employment is found to be important for wage 
estimates of both men and women, the selection into parenthood is mostly relevant for 
women.  
The results of this paper bring new insights regarding the sources of the wage inequality 
by gender. Based on the modification of standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition we show 
that wage inequalities due to parenthood, both among women and men, constitute a 
significant part of the gender wage gap. This is true both for Poland and Hungary. In 
Hungary mothers are found to pay a high penalty for their motherhood in a form of lower 
wages. The gap is however entirely explained by women’s selection into employment and 
parenthood. The existence of the gender wage gap is thus largely attributable to the gender 
wage gap that prevails among childless individuals and the fact that men who have children 
receive substantially higher wages. For Poland when selections are considered, we find much 
higher parenthood based wage inequality among women. The cost of motherhood in Poland 
is therefore much higher than in Hungary, the country that offers women better chances to 
combine work and family related responsibilities. The divergence of men’s and women’s 
wages in Poland is thus predominately caused by women’s higher cost of motherhood and 
men’s fatherhood wage premiums.  
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APPENDIX  
Table A. 1.  
Summary statistics for Poland, sample of full time working individuals  
aged 25-60. 
Variables Poland 
Men Women Women 
parent 
Women 
non-
parent 
Men 
parent 
Men non-
parent 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Age 40.58 40.526 40.623 40.351 41.035 39.704 
No education and less than 
primary 
0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 
Primary education 0.071 0.048 0.048 0.047 0.068 0.077 
Vocational education 0.717 0.54 0.578 0.472 0.743 0.667 
High school 0.045 0.093 0.092 0.095 0.043 0.048 
Tertiary education 0.167 0.319 0.282 0.386 0.145 0.208 
Married 0.855 0.847 0.974 0.618 0.986 0.603 
Parent 0.658 0.643     
Private sector 0.694 0.515 0.51 0.525 0.682 0.717 
City 500+ th. 0.11 0.141 0.123 0.175 0.098 0.133 
City 200-500 th. 0.091 0.104 0.1 0.11 0.087 0.097 
City 100-200 th. 0.075 0.08 0.081 0.08 0.077 0.072 
City 20-100 th. 0.192 0.2 0.201 0.199 0.195 0.186 
City less 20 th. 0.116 0.125 0.129 0.117 0.119 0.11 
Village 0.416 0.35 0.366 0.32 0.423 0.401 
Region Central 0.199 0.225 0.22 0.236 0.194 0.207 
Region North 0.148 0.14 0.141 0.139 0.151 0.142 
Region East 0.158 0.156 0.158 0.15 0.161 0.153 
Region North-West 0.167 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.165 0.172 
Region South-West 0.107 0.103 0.1 0.108 0.102 0.116 
Region South 0.222 0.217 0.222 0.208 0.227 0.211 
Warsaw region 0.135 0.156 0.15 0.165 0.133 0.138 
Hourly wage 10.244 8.341 8.232 8.538 10.698 9.372 
Ln of hourly wage 2.2 2.013 2.004 2.03 2.244 2.117 
Number of kids   1.745  1.859  
Household's financial income 2.323 2.456 2.427 2.508 2.146 2.661 
Household's benefits 3.795 3.853 2.632 6.055 2.476 6.328 
Spouse that is employed 0.532 0.695 0.823 0.463 0.618 0.367 
Total number of people living in 
the HH 
3.779 3.543 3.929 2.847 4.077 3.205 
Parent living in the household 0.089 0.083 0.08 0.089 0.085 0.096 
Housing tenure 19.276 19.21 17.378 22.512 16.792 24.051 
Partner's age 2.976 3.053 3.108 2.955 2.973 2.982 
Total number of rooms 39.473 43.791 42.925 46.183 38.693 41.813 
No observations 61326 43857 28207 15650 40336 20990 
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Table A. 2.  
Summary statistics for Hungary, sample of full time working individuals,  
aged 25-60. 
Variables Hungary 
Men Women Women 
parent 
Women 
non-
parent 
Men 
parent 
Men non-
parent 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Age 40.299 41.791 43.248 39.256 42.487 37.024 
No education and less than 
primary 
0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.008 
Primary education 0.086 0.091 0.1 0.075 0.091 0.077 
Vocational education 0.644 0.528 0.57 0.454 0.662 0.618 
High school 0.058 0.058 0.053 0.067 0.05 0.069 
Tertiary education 0.206 0.318 0.272 0.398 0.192 0.229 
Married 0.681 0.761 0.941 0.449 0.937 0.297 
Parent 0.6 0.635     
Urbanization high density 0.312 0.326 0.277 0.411 0.272 0.371 
Urbanization medium 
density 
0.204 0.211 0.208 0.217 0.206 0.202 
Urbanization rare density 0.484 0.463 0.515 0.372 0.522 0.428 
Region Central 0.251 0.265 0.224 0.337 0.214 0.306 
Region Central 
Transdanubia 
0.111 0.103 0.104 0.101 0.111 0.112 
Region Western 
Transdanubia 
0.122 0.114 0.126 0.094 0.127 0.113 
Region South Transdanubia 0.088 0.094 0.098 0.085 0.092 0.081 
Region Northern Hungary 0.132 0.125 0.131 0.114 0.138 0.124 
Region Northern Plains 0.155 0.156 0.183 0.11 0.182 0.115 
Region Southern Plains 0.141 0.143 0.134 0.159 0.135 0.148 
Hourly wage 887.476 766.216 737.301 816.53 925.682 830.286 
Ln of hourly wage 6.6 6.495 6.465 6.547 6.636 6.546 
Number of kids   1.668  1.812  
Household's financial 
income 
0.222 0.239 0.309 0.117 0.305 0.097 
Household's benefits 1.937 1.061 1.573 0.171 3.012 0.327 
Spouse that is employed 0.485 0.567 0.675 0.378 0.611 0.296 
Total number of people 
living in the HH 
3.489 3.323 3.856 2.396 4.01 2.707 
Parent living in the 
household 
0.065 0.07 0.081 0.052 0.076 0.047 
Housing tenure 17.494 18.698 18.421 19.179 15.268 20.825 
Partner's age 2.842 2.883 3.033 2.621 2.965 2.658 
Total number of rooms 40.208 46.69 46.623 46.89 39.935 41.201 
No of observations 6045 4776 3033 1743 3624 2421 
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Table A. 3.  
OLS and DMF regression results for Poland – sample of full time non-agricultural  
and not self-employed workers aged 25-60; dependent variables logarithm of an hourly wage 
Variables 
OLS DMF correction 
women men 
women 
parent 
women 
nonparent men parent 
men 
nonparent 
women 
parent 
women 
nonparent men parent 
men 
nonparent 
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Parent 0.015*** 0.078***                 
  (0.005) (0.004) 
   
  
   
  
Married 0.010* 0.174*** -0.015 0.001 0.053*** 0.166*** 0.047*** 0.036*** 0.080*** 0.123*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.007) (0.018) (0.006) (0.021) (0.010) (0.022) (0.011) 
Age 31 to 36 0.121*** 0.083*** 0.097*** 0.127*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.102*** 0.136*** 0.083*** 0.084*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Age 37 to 42 0.160*** 0.095*** 0.134*** 0.176*** 0.079*** 0.085*** 0.130*** 0.184*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) 
Age 43 to 48 0.182*** 0.069*** 0.151*** 0.220*** 0.049*** 0.097*** 0.133*** 0.202*** 0.110*** 0.125*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Age 49 to 54 0.218*** 0.049*** 0.178*** 0.250*** 0.014* 0.093*** 0.145*** 0.234*** 0.078*** 0.126*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
Age 55 to 60 0.270*** 0.043*** 0.228*** 0.296*** -0.010 0.077*** 0.211*** 0.363*** 0.053*** 0.164*** 
  (0.012) (0.007) (0.021) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.026) (0.022) (0.017) (0.013) 
Primary 
education 
0.093 -0.035 0.168*** -0.101 -0.175 0.112 0.127 -0.300 -0.091 0.000 
 
(0.073) (0.103) (0.048) (0.194) (0.166) (0.107) (0.083) (0.191) (0.147) (0.104) 
Vocational 
education 
0.281*** 0.142 0.334*** 0.129 0.006 0.288*** 0.258** -0.123 0.056 0.141 
 
(0.073) (0.103) (0.047) (0.194) (0.166) (0.107) (0.083) (0.191) (0.147) (0.105) 
High school 0.334*** 0.184* 0.385*** 0.184 0.054 0.317*** 0.306*** -0.073 0.102 0.168 
 
(0.073) (0.104) (0.048) (0.194) (0.167) (0.108) (0.083) (0.190) (0.150) (0.104) 
Tertiary 
education 
0.682*** 0.533*** 0.750*** 0.511*** 0.437*** 0.629*** 0.641*** 0.217 0.466*** 0.456*** 
  (0.073) (0.104) (0.047) (0.194) (0.166) (0.107) (0.084) (0.191) (0.148) (0.107) 
Private sector -0.005 -0.036*** -0.013*** 0.012* -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.012*** 0.012* -0.032*** -0.035*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
CORRECTIONS 
      
    
Working parent  
    
 
 
-0.033* 
 
-0.126*** 
    
    
  
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.012) 
Working 
nonparent   
    
  
-0.072*** 
 
-0.038 
     
    
  (0.029) 
 
(0.024) 
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Not working 
parent   
    
  
0.166*** -0.001 0.436*** 0.069*** 
    
    
  (0.026) (0.030) (0.029) (0.021) 
Not working 
nonparent   
    
  
-0.077* 0.088*** -0.330*** 0.099*** 
          (0.043) (0.021) (0.042) (0.018) 
Number of 
observations 
43 853 61 317 28 204 15 649 40 332 20 985 28 204 15 649 40 332 20 985 
R2 0.313 0.248 0.319 0.307 0.231 0.257 0.321 0.311 0.241 0.264 
           Notes:  1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
2) Control variables: size of the place of residence, regional dummies, and year fixed effects.  
3) Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors in OLS: White robust standard errors; Standard errors in DMF: bootstrapped at 100 replications. 
 
Table A. 4.  
OLS and DMF regression results for Hungary – sample of full time non-agricultural  
and not self-employed workers aged 25-60; dependent variables logarithm of an hourly wage. 
Variables 
OLS DMF correction 
women men 
women 
parent 
women 
nonparent men parent 
men 
nonparent 
women 
parent 
women 
nonparent men parent 
men 
nonparent 
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Parent -0.019 0.010                 
  (0.017) (0.019) 
   
    
  
  
Married -0.046** 0.140*** 0.049 -0.078*** 0.111** 0.139*** 0.018 -0.045 0.049 0.073* 
  (0.021) (0.023) (0.037) (0.025) (0.046) (0.029) (0.058) (0.037) (0.062) (0.040) 
Age 31 to 36 0.102*** 0.116*** 0.092** 0.118*** 0.132*** 0.091*** 0.057 0.127*** 0.096** 0.086*** 
  (0.023) (0.021) (0.045) (0.031) (0.034) (0.028) (0.064) (0.027) (0.037) (0.028) 
Age 37 to 42 0.191*** 0.140*** 0.185*** 0.232*** 0.149*** 0.106*** 0.129** 0.242*** 0.108*** 0.136*** 
  (0.025) (0.024) (0.043) (0.056) (0.036) (0.037) (0.064) (0.058) (0.036) (0.037) 
Age 43 to 48 0.207*** 0.109*** 0.203*** 0.215*** 0.104*** 0.140*** 0.138** 0.215*** 0.069** 0.184*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.043) (0.042) (0.035) (0.046) (0.066) (0.047) (0.033) (0.048) 
Age 49 to 54 0.216*** 0.083*** 0.236*** 0.186*** 0.102*** 0.033 0.173*** 0.166*** 0.091** 0.097** 
  (0.024) (0.025) (0.045) (0.032) (0.036) (0.041) (0.059) (0.044) (0.034) (0.049) 
Age 55 to 60 0.233*** 0.044 0.234*** 0.252*** -0.018 0.118** 0.227*** 0.211*** -0.001 0.211*** 
  (0.026) (0.030) (0.048) (0.037) (0.042) (0.046) (0.053) (0.054) (0.051) (0.059) 
Primary 
education 
0.478** 0.134 0.575* 0.290 0.154 0.115 0.501* 0.306 0.110 0.055 
 
(0.241) (0.098) (0.341) (0.308) (0.169) (0.100) (0.290) (0.322) (0.17) (0.101) 
Vocational 
education 
0.717*** 0.309*** 0.812** 0.529* 0.338** 0.292*** 0.681** 0.561* 0.273 0.170* 
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(0.240) (0.095) (0.340) (0.306) (0.167) (0.094) (0.282) (0.312) (0.18) (0.103) 
High school 0.859*** 0.499*** 0.910*** 0.739** 0.562*** 0.431*** 0.760*** 0.781** 0.489** 0.279** 
 
(0.241) (0.099) (0.341) (0.308) (0.171) (0.102) (0.284) (0.315) (0.187) (0.12) 
Tertiary 
education 
1.262*** 0.970*** 1.338*** 1.094*** 1.064*** 0.867*** 1.181*** 1.133*** 0.990*** 0.717*** 
  (0.240) (0.096) (0.340) (0.306) (0.168) (0.097) (0.283) (0.310) (0.187) (0.107) 
CORRECTIONS 
      
    
Working parent  
    
 
 
0.061 
 
-0.155 
    
    
  
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.094) 
Working 
nonparent   
    
  
-0.105 
 
0.160* 
     
    
  (0.075) 
 
(0.093) 
 Not working 
parent   
    
  
0.112** 0.044 0.061 0.039 
    
    
  (0.050) (0.147) (0.107) (0.134) 
Not working 
nonparent   
    
  
0.045 -0.099 -0.162 0.174** 
          (0.094) (0.081) (0.158) (0.079) 
Number of 
observations 
4 776 6 045 3 033 1 743 3 624 2 421 3 033 1 743 3 624 2 421 
R2 0.357 0.291 0.341 0.392 0.312 0.265 0.341 0.386 0.310 0.264 
Notes:  1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
2) Control variables: size of the place of residence, regional dummies, and year fixed effects.  
3) Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors in OLS: White robust standard errors; Standard errors in DMF: bootstrapped at 100 replications. 
Table A. 5.  
Contribution of the family gaps into the gender wage gap for Poland –  
based on the uncorrected estimates 
Gender wage gap 0.187 
Family gap among women 
  Estimates Family gap decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
Family gap -0.027 100% 0.017 9% 
Explained total -0.040 152% 0.026 14% 
by   
  
  
Age 0.011 -39% -0.007 -4% 
Education -0.040 148% 0.026 14% 
Marriage 0.011 -41% -0.007 -4% 
Rest -0.022 82% 0.014 8% 
Unexplained total 0.014 -52% -0.009 -5% 
by   
  
  
Age -0.028 103% 0.018 10% 
Education 0.191 -709% -0.123 -66% 
Marriage -0.022 80% 0.014 7% 
Rest -0.128 474% 0.082 44% 
Family gap among men 
  Estimates Family gap decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
Family gap 0.127 100% 0.083 45% 
Explained total 0.047 37% 0.031 16% 
by   
  
  
Age 0.017 13% 0.011 6% 
Education -0.017 -14% -0.011 -6% 
Marriage 0.068 54% 0.045 24% 
Rest -0.021 -16% -0.014 -7% 
Unexplained total 0.080 63% 0.053 28% 
by   
 
0.000   
Age -0.049 -39% -0.032 -17% 
Education -0.250 -197% -0.165 -88% 
Marriage -0.112 -88% -0.074 -40% 
Rest 0.492 387% 0.323 173% 
Gender wage gap among nonparents 
  Estimates GWG decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
GWG 0.087 100% 0.087 46% 
Explained total -0.094 -108% -0.094 -50% 
by   
  
  
Age -0.004 -4% -0.004 -2% 
Education -0.077 -89% -0.077 -41% 
Marriage -0.001 -1% -0.001 0% 
Rest -0.012 -14% -0.012 -6% 
Unexplained total 0.181 208% 0.181 97% 
by   
  
  
Age -0.074 -85% -0.074 -39% 
Education 0.109 126% 0.109 58% 
Marriage 0.095 109% 0.095 51% 
Rest 0.050 57% 0.050 27% 
Notes:  
1) Column 1 presents the estimates of the family gap decompositions for men and women and gender wage gap 
decomposition among childless individuals; 
2) Column 2 presents the decomposition of the family gap decompositions for men and women and gender wage gap 
decomposition among childless individuals showing the percentage of the gap that is due to the certain components 
3) Column 3 represents the contribution of the family gaps among men and women and gender wage gap among 
childless individuals and their components    
4) Column 4 represents percentage contribution of the family gaps among men and women and gender wage gap 
among childless individuals and their components to the overall gender wage gap 
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Table A. 6.  
Contribution of the family gaps into the gender wage gap for Hungary – 
 based on the uncorrected estimates 
Gender wage gap 0.104 
Family gap among women 
  Estimates Family gap decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
Family gap -0.081 100% 0.051 49.3% 
Explained total -0.082 101% 0.052 49.5% 
by   
  
  
Age 0.078 -96% -0.049 -47.2% 
Education -0.086 105% 0.054 51.9% 
Marriage -0.038 47% 0.024 23.0% 
Rest -0.036 44% 0.023 21.9% 
Unexplained total 0.000 -1% 0.000 -0.3% 
by    
  
  
Age 0.021 -26% -0.014 -13.0% 
Education 0.258 -317% -0.163 -156.1% 
Marriage 0.115 -141% -0.073 -69.6% 
Rest -0.394 484% 0.249 238.5% 
Family gap among men 
  Estimates Family gap decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
Family gap 0.090 100% 0.054 51.4% 
Explained total 0.080 89% 0.048 45.8% 
by   
  
  
Age 0.038 42% 0.023 21.7% 
Education -0.028 -31% -0.017 -15.9% 
Marriage 0.088 98% 0.053 50.3% 
Rest -0.018 -20% -0.011 -10.4% 
Unexplained total 0.010 11% 0.006 5.6% 
by    
  
  
Age 0.006 7% 0.004 3.5% 
Education 0.099 110% 0.059 56.6% 
Marriage -0.018 -20% -0.011 -10.3% 
Rest -0.077 -86% -0.046 -44.2% 
Gender wage gap among nonparents 
  Estimates GWG decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
GWG -0.001 100% -0.001 -1.0% 
Explained total -0.123 11586% -0.123 -117.3% 
by   
  
  
Age -0.003 316% -0.003 -3.2% 
Education -0.097 9173% -0.097 -92.9% 
Marriage -0.015 1464% -0.015 -14.8% 
Rest -0.007 633% -0.007 -6.4% 
Unexplained total 0.121 -11486% 0.121 116.3% 
by    
  
  
Age -0.074 7009% -0.074 -71.0% 
Education -0.214 20244% -0.214 -205.0% 
Marriage 0.093 -8783% 0.093 88.9% 
Rest 0.317 -29956% 0.317 303.3% 
Notes: Columns description as in Table A. 5. 
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Table A. 7.  
Contribution of the family gaps into the gender wage gap for Poland –  
based on the corrected estimates 
GWG 0.187 
Family gap among women 
  Estimates Family gap decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
Family gap 
women -0.027 100% 0.017 9% 
Explained -0.025 92% 0.016 9% 
by 
   
  
Marriage 0.013 -48% -0.008 -4% 
Age 0.019 -69% -0.012 -6% 
Education -0.036 132% 0.023 12% 
Rest -0.021 78% 0.013 7% 
Unexplained -0.029 107% 0.019 10% 
by 
   
  
Marriage 0.011 -40% -0.007 -4% 
Age -0.055 204% 0.035 19% 
Education 0.395 -1463% -0.254 -136% 
Rest -0.380 1407% 0.244 131% 
Selection 0.027 -102% -0.018 -9% 
Family gap among men 
  Estimates Family gap decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
Family gap men 0.127 100% 0.083 45% 
Explained 0.031 25% 0.021 11% 
by 
   
  
Marriage 0.047 37% 0.031 17% 
Age 0.022 17% 0.014 8% 
Education -0.018 -14% -0.012 -6% 
Rest -0.019 -15% -0.012 -7% 
Unexplained 0.141 111% 0.093 50% 
by 
   
  
Marriage -0.042 -33% -0.028 -15% 
Age -0.017 -13% -0.011 -6% 
Education -0.071 -56% -0.046 -25% 
Rest 0.271 213% 0.178 95% 
Selection -0.046 -36% -0.030 -16% 
Gender wage gap among nonparents 
  Estimates GWG decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
GWG childless 
individuals 0.087 100% 0.087 46% 
Explained -0.084 -97% -0.084 -45% 
by   
  
  
Marriage -0.002 -2% -0.002 -1% 
Age -0.003 -3% -0.003 -2% 
Education -0.062 -71% -0.062 -33% 
Rest -0.018 -21% -0.018 -10% 
Unexplained 0.125 144% 0.125 67% 
by   
  
  
Marriage 0.053 61% 0.053 29% 
Age -0.068 -78% -0.068 -36% 
Education 0.254 292% 0.254 136% 
Rest -0.114 -132% -0.114 -61% 
Selection 0.046 53% 0.046 25% 
Notes: Columns description as in Table A. 5. 
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Table A. 8.  
Contribution of the family gaps into the gender wage gap for Hungary –  
based on the corrected estimates 
GWG 0.104 
Family gap among women 
  Estimates Family gap decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
Family gap 
women -0.081 100% 0.051 49% 
Explained -0.064 78% 0.040 38% 
by   
  
  
Marriage -0.022 27% 0.014 13% 
Age 0.076 -93% -0.048 -46% 
Education -0.081 99% 0.051 49% 
Rest -0.037 45% 0.023 22% 
Unexplained 0.054 -67% -0.034 -33% 
by   
  
  
Marriage 0.060 -73% -0.038 -36% 
Age -0.059 73% 0.037 36% 
Education 0.100 -123% -0.063 -60% 
Rest -0.046 57% 0.029 28% 
Selection -0.072 89% 0.046 44% 
Family gap among men 
  Estimates Family gap decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
Family gap men 0.090 100% 0.054 51% 
Explained 0.058 65% 0.035 33% 
by   
  
  
Marriage 0.047 52% 0.028 27% 
Age 0.048 54% 0.029 28% 
Education -0.024 -26% -0.014 -14% 
Rest -0.013 -15% -0.008 -8% 
Unexplained 0.015 17% 0.009 9% 
by   
  
  
Marriage -0.023 -26% -0.014 -13% 
Age -0.049 -55% -0.030 -28% 
Education 0.136 152% 0.081 78% 
Rest -0.048 -54% -0.029 -28% 
Selection 0.016 18% 0.010 9% 
Gender wage gap among nonparents 
  Estimates GWG decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
GWG childless 
individuals -0.001 100% -0.001 -1% 
Explained -0.114 10804% -0.114 -109% 
by   
  
  
Marriage -0.011 1051% -0.011 -11% 
Age -0.006 546% -0.006 -6% 
Education -0.093 8782% -0.093 -89% 
Rest -0.004 425% -0.004 -4% 
Unexplained 0.193 -18271% 0.193 185% 
by   
  
  
Marriage 0.053 -5032% 0.053 51% 
Age -0.028 2680% -0.028 -27% 
Education -0.396 37422% -0.396 -379% 
Rest 0.564 -53340% 0.564 540% 
Selection -0.080 7567% -0.080 -77% 
Notes: Columns description as in Table A. 5. 
